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It is not necessary that Margreth Williams should prove
that she produced by her labor a part of the very money that
was used in purchasing the land. If she and Thomas Jefferson
were working together to a common purpose, and the proceeds
of labor performed by them became the joint property of the
two ... each would own the property acquired in proportion to
the value of his labor contributed to the acquisition of it.40
It is not suggested that the Keene court was bound to invoke the
reasoning employed in Hayworth v. Williams. It is suggested, however,
that the court could have allowed plaintiff to recover upon several ra-
tionales. "In the absence of a controlling contract such an interest
stems from the fact that the property was acquired through the joint
efforts or contributions of the parties with the intention that both
should share in its benefits .... 41
The Keene court, however, refused to indulge in the mild presump-
tion that the parties intended to deal fairly with each other. The Keene
decision has the effect of allowing one guilty party to profit at the
expense of another guilty party. As was mentioned in the dissenting
opinion, one standard is applied to the man, while a second more
strict standard is applied to the woman. It is submitted that the Keene
decision was unfair and not in the interests of good public policy.
The illicit cohabitation turned out to be quite profitable to defendant
inasmuch as he was able to take advantage of her services to him in
his businesses for approximately seventeen years without having to
compensate her. While the illicit relationship itself gives rise to no
rights, plaintiff should not be deprived of rights which she would enjoy
were it not for the relationship.
JOHN W. JOHNSON
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY FOR DEFENSE
OF THIRD PERSONS
In criminal law an interesting question arises whether a person
aggressively intervening in a struggle between two other persons is
judged by his own intent or by 'that of -the person whom he defends.
The 'difference in approach may determine whether the intervenor
is himself guilty of a criminal offense.
The question ,is considered in 'the New York case of People v.
40Id. at 46.
OBeuck v. Howe, 71 S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744, 745 (1946).
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Young.' Two plain-clothes detectives observed an argument between
two motorists in the middle of a busy -thoroughfare; when one of
them, McGriff, refused 'to move out of the street, one of the detectives,
after identifying himself, undertook to arrest him. A struggle ensued.
The defendant came out of the crowd, which had gathered, and at-
tacked one of the detectives from the rear. As a result of the encounter,
the detective was injured. The defendant was indicted for assault in
the third degree. He contended that he did not know the 'two men
were police officers, but thought they were wrongfully assaulting Mc-
Griff. A conviction of assault in ithe third degree was reversed by the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, but the conviction was re-
instated by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in upholding the conviction reasoned that
the right of one person to defend another should not be greater than
such person's right ,to defend himself.2 The majority of the court held
that -the motive of the defendant is immaterial, because, in New York,
to be guilty of the offense charged, "It is sufficient that the defendant
voluntarily intended to commit the unlawful act of touching."3
A dissenting opinion took the view 'that the basic element neces-
sary for criminal liability is a guilty mind, or mens reas, and if the
defendant entertained an "honest and reasonable belief" that the facts
were as he perceived them to be, he is not guilty of any criminal of-
fense.4 The dissenting opinion went on to say that the majority was ig-
noring a basic principle of criminal law, "That crimes mala in se
require proof of at least general criminal -intent," and in doing so was
eliminating the defense of mistake-of-fact. 5
There are two approaches to the right of one person to intervene
in a struggle on the behalf of another. One is that the fault of the
defended party is imputed ,to the one who intervenes on his behalf,
while the other is that 'the -intervening party is bound only by his own
intent.
The prevailing rule, commonly referred to as the "alter ego" rule,6
is that the right of one person to defend -another is co-extensive with
the right of ,the other to defend himself. 7 In other words, the party
11i N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.,2d 1 (1962).
2183 N.E. 2d at 32o, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
3Ibid.
'People v. Young, ix N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 321, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1962)).
ribid.
'State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A.2d 506 (1961).
7Griffin v. State, 229 Ala. 482, 158 So. 316 (1934); Thompson v. State, 37 Ala.
App. 446, 70 So. 2d 282 (1954); Pacheco v. People, 96 Colo. 401, 43 P.2d 165 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Hounchell, 280 Ky. 217, 132 S.W.2d 921 (1939); Stanley v. Com-
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who intervenes in a struggle "stands in the shoes of the one de-
fended,"' and therefore, if -the party who is being defended was the
aggressor and could not claim self-defense, his "rescuer" is to be
treated as an aggressor also.9 The rule is applicable where the party
who intervenes does not have knowledge of the aggressiveness of the
one defended, 10 acting upon outward appearances or misinformation.1
The prevailing rule generally does not make any distinction be-
tween the defense of strangers, social guests12 and members of one's
family.13 In State v. Ronnie,14 the New Jersey court held a person had
the right to defend his social guests provided the right of self-defense
would have been available to the one defended. However, -there has
been some attempt to limit the application of the rule as to the de-
fense of one's relatives. In State v. Best,1 5 for example, West Virginia
held that persons standing in certain relationships of consanguinity
may resist an officer in making an unlawful arrest. But the Alabama
court in Robinson v. City of Decatur'0 applied the more generally
accepted view ,that one who intervenes in defense of a relative is in no
different situation than if he had intervened in defense of a nonrela-
tive.
A leading case adhering to the majority approach is the South
Carolina decision in State v. Cook.'7 In that case, the deceased, a spe-
cial policeman, was assigned to preserve order at a carnival. When the
monwealth, 86 Ky. 44o, 6 S.W. 155 (1887); Guerriero v. State, 213 Md. 545, 132 A.2d
466 (1957); State v. Ritter, 239 N.C. 89, 79 S.E.2d 164 (1953); State v. Anderson,
222 N.C. 148, 22 S.E.2d 271 (1942); State v. Young, 52 Ore. 227, 96 Pac. 1o67 (i9o8);
Moore v. State, 219 Pac. 175 (Okla. 1923); State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862
(19o6); Crowder v. State, 8 Lea 669 (Tenn. 1881); Waddell v. State, i Tex. Crim.
720 (1877); State v. Best, 91 W. Va. 559, 113 S.E. 919 (1912). See 6 C.J.S., Assault and
Battery § 93 (1957)-
'Thompson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 446, 70 So. 2d 282, 284 (1954).
9Humphries v. State, 28 Ala. 159, 181 SO. 309 (1938).
"Wood v. State, 128 Ala. 27, 29 SO. 557 (1900).
uState v. Hays, 67 Mo. 692 (1878). This case has not been expressly overruled
even though Missouri is aligned with the minority jurisdictions in note 27 infra.
'State v. Ronnie, 41 N.J. Super. 339, 125 A.2d 163 (Essex County Ct. 1956).
Even though New Jersey is classified as a jurisdiction adhering to the minority rule
in note 22 infra, State v. Ronnie has not been expressly overruled but only dis-
tinguished by the subsequent case.
Robinson v. City of Decatur, 32 Ala. 654, 29 So. 2d 429 (Ct. App. 1947);
Pacheco v. People, 96 Colo. 401, 43 P.-d 165 ('935); State v. Herdina, 25 Minn. 161
(1878); State v. Melton, o0 Mo. 683, 15 S.W. 139 (1891); State v. Anderson, 222
N.C. 148, 22 S.E.-d 271 (1942); Waddell v. State, i Tex. Crim 720 (1877).
"'See note 12 Supra.
291 W. Va. 559, 113 S.E. 919 (1922).
1332 Ala. 654, 29 So. 2d 429 (Ct. App. 1947).
1778 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907).
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deceased sought to arrest Daisy Cook for an alleged breach of a town
ordinance, he was shot and killed .by Daisy's brothers who had come
upon the scene. In affirming a conviction of manslaughter, the South
Carolina court held that freedom from fault in bringing on the difficul-
ty on the part of the party defended is a condition precedent to a plea
of self-defense by one who intervenes on his behalf. The court went
on to say that the law does not give one person the right to provoke
a difficulty, and then allow another to intervene and kill on his behalf.
The underlying theory of the majority rule is applicable also to
the amount of force that may be employed in the defense of third
persons. In other words, an intervening party may use whatever force
the defended party may have employed, and no more.' s This necessar-
ily follows because, as emphasized in the Kentucky case of Stanley v.
Commonwealth,19 the intervening party "takes the place of one of the
combatants, and can only do for him what he had the right to do under
the circumstances in defense of himself."20
The minority view is that one who intervenes in a struggle under
a reasonable but mistaken belief that he is protecting another who
he assumes is being unlawfully assaulted is thereby exonerated from
criminal liability.2 1 Tiis is commonly referred to as -the "objective
test" theory.22 In other words, -the culpability of the intervening party
is measured by the intent with which he acted and not by the intent
of the party for whom he was acting, the intent of the latter being
immaterial.2s The courts following the minority approach reason that
in order for there -to be criminal culpability, the defendant must have
mens rea,24 and when one intervenes on behalf of another under the
reasonable belief 'that the other is in imminent danger, mens rea is
obviously lacking. Therefore, under this approach, "the acts and
conduct of the defendant must be judged solely with reference to the
situation as it was when he first and afterwards saw it."25
IsStanley v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 44o, 6 S.W. 155 (1887).
29Ibid.
2id at 156.
2mVilliams v. State, 70 Ga. App. 1o, 27 S.E.2d 109 (1943); State v. Menilla, 177
Iowa 283, 158 N.W. 645 (1916); State v. Mounkes, 88 Kan. 193, 127 Pac. 637 (1912);
McGehee v. State, 138 Miss. 822, 104 So. 150 (1925); State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J.
Super. 479, 174 A.2d 506 (ig6i); People v. Maine, 166 N.Y. 50, 59 N.E. 696 (go);
People v. Coleman, 7 App. Div. 2d 155, i8o N.Y.S. 2d 978 (1959). See generally
Perkins, Criminal Law (1957).
22 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 219 (12th ed. 1957).
=State v. Menilla, 177 Iowa 283, 158 N.W. 645 (1916).
-'Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951); State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174
A.2d 5o6 (1961). See generally 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
3People v. Maine, 166 N.Y. 5o , 59 N.E. 696 (19o).
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The minority rule is equa'lly applicable to interventions on behalf
of strangers, social guests26 and members of one's family.27 As long as
the intervening party reasonably believes that an apparently blame-
less party is in danger of great bodily harm, he may lawfully intervene
on his behalf even though he -is misinformed about the conflict,28 or
was mistaken as to who was in fact the aggressor.2 9
A leading case adihering to the minority approach is Mayhew v.
State.30 There a struggle ensued between the defendant's son and
the deceased, in which the former was the aggressive party. The de-
fendant, who was in his store at the inception of .the incident, was in-
formed by a third person that his son was being killed. The defendant
rushed to the scene and stabbed the person struggling with his son,
causing his death. In reversing a conviction of murder in the second
degree, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the culpa-
bility of a party intervening in a difficulty between ,two other persons
is measured by the intent with which he acted and not by 'the intent
of ,the party defended, unless -the defendant knew or might reasonably
have known the intent of the person defended. The court went on to
reason that the apprehension of danger must be viewed from the
position of the defendant, "whether he acts in his own behalf or in be-
half of another."3'
In reference ,to 'the amount of force that may be used in the defense
of third -persons, State v. Menilla,3 2 points out that an intervening
party may use whatever force he reasonably considers necessary in
the protection of ,third persons, even though the party defended
knows or should know that 'the quantum of force ultimately used was
not necessary. Therefore, the objective test is applied not only to de-
termine the lawfulness of the intervention, but also the amount of
force ,that may be employed.
In comparing the majority and minority approaches, certain ad-
vantages and shortcomings of each become apparent.
In applying the majority approach, the principal feature, as
brought out by Oklahoma in Hare v. State,-3 is that although in cer-
"State v. Yates, 3oi Mo. 225, 256 S.W. 8o9 (1923).
"Brannin v. State, 221 Ind. 123, 46 N.E.2d 599 (1943).
'Mayhew v. State, 65 Tex. Crim. 290, 144 S.W. 229 (q912). Although Texas is
classified as a jurisdiction adhering to the majority rule in notes 7 and 13 supra,
the Mayhew case does not expressly overrule that case.
"Brannin v. State, 221 Ind. 123, 46 N.E. 2d 599 (1943)-
30See note 28 Supra.
'id. at 231.
a 177 Iowa 283, 158 N.W. 645 (1916).
"58 Okla. Crim. 420, 54 P.2d 670 (1936).
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tain instances this rule may work hardships, it prevents an innocent
person who had been compelled to strike in self-defense from being
attacked with impunity merely because at the time the intervening
party came upon the scene of conflict appearances happened to be
against the wrongfully assaulted party.
The most important result of the minority approach is the main-
taining of the fundamental principle tthat one must have mens rea
or a "guilty mind" in order to be subject to criminal liability. An-
other important feature of -the minority rule is that if a party, before
he can lawfully intervene on the behalf of another, must wait until
he ascertains who was at fault, then an innocent party may be more
seriously assaulted or even killed because no one will intervene on
his behalf.34 The final aspect of the minority approach is that such
approach preserves the mistake-of-fact doctrine, which is a distinct
part of criminal law. The preservation of such doctrine prevents an
intervening party from being guilty of the most serious crimes when
he acts entirely without mens rea, and from the highest sense of duty.
The American Law Institute has recognized the serious shortcom-
ings of the majority approach and has chosen ,to adhere to the minor-
ity rule in the Model Penal Code. 35 The comments on the pertinent
section of the Penal Code bring out ,that liability without fault is an
indefensible principle.3 6 The draftsmen of the Code stress the fact
that innocent persons may be injured without receiving assistance
from bystanders because bystanders who know the law will be very
cautious and refrain from acting.3 7 Therefore it appears that the
minority rule is the preferable one. Under such rule, not only is the
mistake-of-fact doctrine preserved, and the traditional application
of the mens rea theory applied, but one will not hesitate in going to
the aid of another who is being subjected to an assault.
JAY FREDERICK WILXS
NIt was pointed out in i Bishop on Criminal Law § 303 (9th ed. 1923) that:
"What is absolute truth no man ordinarily knows. All act from what appears, not
from what is. If persons were to delay their steps until made sure, beyond every
possibility of mistake, that they were right, earthly affairs would cease to move;
and stagnation, death, and universal decay would follow. All therefore, must, and
constantly do, perform what else they would not, through mistake of facts."
5NModel Penal Code § 3.05 (1962).
"Model Penal Code § 3.o5, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1956).
=Ibid.
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